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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. No. 9937 
LARRY MYERS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
2nd District Court for Weber County 
Hon. John F. Wahlquist, Judge 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a prosecution brought by the State of Utah 
against the defendant, charging him with violation of Sec-
tion 76-53-15 (1), \\~herein the defendant was charged with 
having sexual intercourse with a female under the age of 
thirteen years of age. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. From the verdict of the 
jury of guilty and the sentence by the court to imprison-
ment in the Utah State Prison, the defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and the 
grantin1g of a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant was charged with the crime of rape, 
under Section 76-53-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953. The 
defendant was charged with having sexual intercourse on 
or about the 19th day of October, 1962, in Weber County, 
State of Utah, with his daughter, Sherry Myers, age ten 
years. The evidence adduced by the State at the trial con .. 
sisted of the testimony of the child, Sherry Myers, that on 
several occasions during the months of September and 
October of 1962, her father had forced her to engage in 
acts of sexual intercourse with him. The State further in-
troduced evidence by the testimony of Dr. Homer Rich, 
a physician, who testified in substance that the girl lacked 
a hymen1 and that the sexual parts were irritated and that 
in his opinion she could have been penetrated, although 
he did not indicate in his opinion whether or not she had 
had sexual intercourse or not. 
The defendant produced evidence to show, in1 addition 
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to the denial of the defendant of any wrong doing, that 
shortly before the alleged rape the child had received a 
severe kick in the area of her sexual parts by a brother 
of the child, and that she had been subjected to the 
influence and pressure of relatives of the defendant to 
secure her leaving the home of the defendant and living 
elsewhere. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THAT THE COURT, IN EXCLUDING ALL WITNESS-
ES, INCLUDING THE RELATIVES OF THE DEFEND-
ANT, DENIED THE DEFENDANT A PUBLIC TRIAL. 
Begnning on page 22 of the transcript in this matter, 
the following remarks were made: 
THE COURT: You may make your opening 
statement. 
MR. NEWEY: If it please, Your Honor, at this 
time by reason of the age of Sherry Myers, our 
proof will show that she is 10 years of age. By 
reason of the nature of this crime, being that of 
rape by reason of the relationship between the girl 
and her father, we would move to exclude the pub-
lic from the courtroom at all times during this trial, 
including any persons. 
MR. BINGHAM: Your Honor, may I approach 
the bench before you rule on it. I would like to 
make a suggestion. 
Your Honor, could this be handled in the ab-
sence of the jury? 
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THE COURT: Under the constitution~ the mo-
tion is denied with the exception of all who may be 
witnesses. All persons who are interviewed as pos-
sible witnesses are to leave. 
MR. BINGHAM: Your Honor, may I make 
something a matter of record at this time? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
All persons who have been interviewed as pos-
sible witnesses, find a place for them. 
BAILIFF: An~body that is going to be a wit-
ness, please step out. 
THE COURT: You may keep one officer with 
you if you want. 
MR. BINGHAM: Your Honor, may I make this 
motion at this time? 
THE COURT: Come forward to the bench. 
MR. BINGHAM: Your Honor, may the record 
show that I approached the bench, and at this time 
I indicated that I wanted to make a proffer to the 
record as to the reasons for objecting to the court's 
order, and that the court at this time indicated that 
the objection would have to be made later? 
THE COURT: Yes. The trial is to be open to 
the public with the exception of the witnesses. They 
may be called back when their presence is neces-
sary for the testimony of the proceedings. 
MR. BINGHAM: May the record further show, 
Your Honor, that this is not the motion of the State, 
no motion for this order was made? 
T·HE COURT: The motion is by the State only. 
MR. BINGHAM: The State didn't make this 
.motion, Your Honor. 
MR. NEWEY: Our original motion, Your Hon-
or, was to exclude all persons from the courtroom, 
and you denied that, I or assume you denied that. 
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THE COURT: To the extent only. I will grant 
it only as to the witnesses. If you want that, you 
can have that. If you don't want it, they can come 
back. 
MR. NEWEY: We do desire that, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, you may proceed. 
Article 1, Section 12, of the Utah State Constitution 
provides, as follows: 
"In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person and 
by counsel, ... to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in which 
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases." 
Title 78-7-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is a statute 
which states the following: 
"Right to exclude in certain cases - In an ac-
tion of divorce, criminal conversation, seduction, 
or abortion, rape, or assault with intent to commit 
rape, the court may, in its discretion, exclude all 
persons who are not directly interested therein, 
except jurors, witnesses, and officers of the court; 
and in any cause the court may, in its discretion, 
during the examination of a witness exclude any 
and all other witnesses in the cause." 
It should be noted at the beginning that the motion 
by the State for the exclusion of all of the public was made 
on the basis of the nature of this case. It was stated to the 
court that the motion was based on the age of the girl, age 
10 years, the relat}onship of the girl and her father, and 
the fact that it was a rape case. There was no motion to 
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exclude witnesses until they had testified, nor was there 
a motion made to exclude people from the courtroom based 
upon any embarrassment of the young girl in the case. 
The key people who were excluded by the order of the 
court, as the roster of witnesses in the transcript shows, 
were in fact the mother of the defendant, the grandmother 
of U.te defendant, and other friends and relatives of the 
defendant. 
In State v. Jordan, 57 Utah 612, 196 P. 565, which was 
a statutory rape trial, the court excluded all of the public 
with the exception of witnesses. The court held that the 
defendant had been denried a public trial within the pur-
view of our constitution and stated the following: 
"We cannot conceive of a case, no matter how 
revolting and disgusting the details of the testi-
mony given, in which the near relatives and friends 
of the accused should not be permitted to be in at-
tendance upon the trial for the purpose of seeing 
that the accused is fairly and justly dealt with by 
the officers of the court and not improperly 
condemned.'' 
In State v. Beckstead, 96 Utah 528, 88 P.2d 461, which 
was a carnal knowledge case, the State made a motion to 
exclude the spectators from the courtroom. Objection was 
made and over the objection the court made an order to 
clear the courtroom with the exception of all witnesses. 
The court in the Beckstead case discussed the implications 
of Title 78-7-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and stated as 
follows: 
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"It will be observed that the part of this later 
section, just quoted down to the semicolon follow-
ing the word court, must relate to civil actions. All 
of them except 'divorce' are actions in tort for 
which recovery of dan1ages may be had and cannot 
refer to criminal prosecutions without conflicting 
with the constitution. That part of the section fol-
lowing the semicolon, relating to 'any cause' but in 
the discretion of the court 'any cause' relates only 
to the exclusion of 'any and all other witnesses in 
the cause' and only during the examination of a 
witness. This is what we think was intended by the 
legislature and avoids any constitutional conflict.'' 
In the case of re: Oliver, 333 U.S. 272, 92 L. E. 693, 68 
Supreme Court Reports 507, the court in citing State v. 
Beckstead indicated with approval that it was error to 
exclude friends and relatives of the accused from the trial 
as was done in the instant case. 
Likewise in People v. Byrnes, 192 P.2d 290, a Califor-
nia case, the defendant was charged with rape and sexual 
perversion and was denied a public trial as guaranteed by 
the Constitution where the sheriff was ordered to admit 
to the courtroom only defendant's counsel, officers of the 
court, jurors, and those having business with the court, 
and excluding others and all witnesses except while on the 
witness stand. 
In the Byrnes case, the deputy district attorney, as in 
the instant case, moved that the matter be heard behind 
closed doors, which was objected to by the defendant. The 
court went on to state with approval a rule as stated in 
People v. Hardman, 37 P. 153, as follows: 
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"The doors of the courtroom are expected to be 
kept open, the public are entitled to be admitted. 
The trial is to be public in all respects, as we have 
before suggested, with due regard to the sizes of the 
courtroom, the conveniences of the court, the right 
to exclude objectionable characters and the youth 
of tender years, and to do other things that may 
facilitate the proper conduct of the trial." 
There appears to be two lines of cases in connection 
with the question of whether the defendant must show 
that actual prejudice resulted from the exclusion by the 
court of a part or all of the public. In State v. Jordan, 57 
Utah 612, 186 P. 565, the court stated the majority rule 
that the defendant having been denied a public trial with-
in the scope of our Constitution, the law presumes that 
the act of the court was prejudicial. Again in State v. 
Beckstead our Supreme Court has stated: 
"The error complained of in the exclusion or-
der may seem technical. It is, however, fundamen-
tal. We are of the opinion that the order excluding 
all spectators including friends and relatives of 
the defendant was error. The Constitution of this 
State, Section1 12, Article 1, provides, among other 
things, that in criminal prosecutions that you shall 
have the right to a speedy, public trial." 
In People v. Byrnes the court again discussed the 
question of actual prejudice and stated the majority rule 
as follows: 
"Appellant has not attempted to prove any act-
ual prejudice resulted from the exclusion of the 
public. The record shows no reason for the order, 
other than the one stated by the court." 
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The court went on in this case to state that there was 
no actual threat of disturbance or disturbance of the pro-
ceedings of the trial, and that there appeared to be no 
necessity for the exclusion order, and there being none the 
order of the court was a clear deprivation of the defend-
ant's right to a public trial. 
In the instant case, the court later modified its order, 
upon the withdrawal by the State of its motion, and al-
lowed everyone to return to the courtroom. 
In1 State v. Beckstead a similar occurrance took place 
and our Supreme Court stated as follows: 
"The fact that the order was later modified by 
advising relatives that they might return and the 
further fact that some of them did return could not 
affect the consequences of the error. The original 
order was carried out during a portion of the trial." 
In State v. Hone, 224 P.2d 500, a Wyoming case, the 
court excluded spectators at the request of the jury in a 
rape case. To this the defendant objected. The court went 
on to state that if the defendant had any special friends 
that he wanted to have stay with him, that they would be 
allowed to remain, but that the public would be excluded. 
The court, in discussing a defendant's rights to a public 
trial, stated with approval the rule from Cooley's Consti-
tutional Limitations 8th (8th ed.) page 647, as follows: 
"The requirement of a public trial is for the 
benefit of the accused; that the public may see he 
is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned, 
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and that the presence of spectators may keep his 
triers, keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility 
and to the importance of their function; and the 
requirement is fairly observed if, without partiality 
or favoritism, a reasonable proportion of the public 
is suffered to attend, notwithstanding that those 
persons whose presence could be of no service to 
the accused, and who would be drawn thither by 
a prurient curiosity or excluded altogether." 
The court, in the Hone case, went on to state that it 
felt there were enough people who were allowed to remain 
in the courtroom to afford to the defendant a fair and pub-
lic trial. In all of the cases wherein the matter was dis-
cussed, the courts have taken special interest in, and have 
been1 greatly concerned that the defendant be allowed to 
retain in the courtroom, friends and relatives. As was stat-
ed in State v. Smith, a Utah case, 67 P.2d 110, a statutory 
rape case, the court stated: 
"It is reasonably clear from the language used 
that relatives and friends were not intended to be 
excluded from the courtroom and there is no com-
plaint that any such persons were in fact excluded." 
The defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial 
in connection with the manner in which the motion for an 
order to exclude the public from the trial was brought to 
the attention of the court. The motion was made by the 
State of Utah, in the presence of the jury, and the defend-
ant, upon objecting thereto, and desiring to discuss the 
matter in the absence of the jury, was denied his request. 
(See quoted portions of the transcript as set forth above.) 
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•fhat the State's motion, requiring the defendant to argue 
his desire for a public trial, in the presence of the jury, in 
view of the nature of the case and the relationship of the 
defendant and the prosecuting witness, could not but have 
placed the defendant in an unfavorable and prejudicial 
light in the eyes of the jury. 
POI1NT II 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL BASED UPON 
DETECTIVE TIM DYER'S TESTIMONY ON CROSS 
EXAMINATION. 
During the opening statement of the district attorney, 
the following statement was made at page 29 of the 
transcript: 
"We will call Officer Dyer who will briefly tell 
you that when this defendant was charged with the 
crime of rape and was advised that he was charged 
with the crime of rape, that instead of the defend-
ant turning and denying it as a father would ... " 
That during the cross examination of the said Tim 
Dyer by defendant's attorney, the following testimony 
was given at page 96: 
Q Were you present here in court when Mr. 
Newey gave his opening statement to the jury? 
A No. I was barred from the courtroom. 
Q I see. Now, is it true that Mr. Myers didn't 
deny the charge of rape? 
A What was this again? 
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Q Did Mr. Myers deny to you that he was 
guilty of rape; yes or no? 
A I don't get your question. Would you re-
peat it again? 
Q When' a man is arrested and charged with 
a crime, the officer asks him if he is guilty of this 
thing. You do this, don't you? 
A On this case or other cases? 
Q On any case, when you arrest a man of a 
crime, you ask him if he is guilty or innocent, 
d-on't you? Did you do it or didn't you? 
A No. We don't ask a fellow if he is guilty or 
innocent, no. 
Q Do you mean to tell me if I got arrested 
for a charge like this you wouldn't ask me if I did 
it? 
A I didn't ask him if he did it. 
Q Is it your testimony under oath that you 
didn't ask Larry Myers if he committed this offense 
or not? 
A That's right. I didn't ask him that. 
Q Is it your testimony that that is standard 
police procedure not to ask an accused person if 
he did the offense that he is charged with? 
A Now, state that question again, please. I 
don't get what the question is. 
Q Is it my understanding that it is standard 
police procedure when you arrest a person not to 
ask him whether he has done the offense that he is 
charged with? 
A It all depends on whether you have other 
cases with this person or not. We know him pretty 
well. 
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Later in the cross examination he was asked, page 96, 
if he knew of any offense that Mr. Myers was guilty of. His 
answer was, as indicated by the record, "no response." On 
page 197 of the transcript, the court, in denying the motion 
for a mistrial, indicated that the answers given by the of-
ficer were fairly made in response to the questions asked. 
In a sex offense, particularly one in which a father is 
accused of having sexual intercourse with his ten year old 
child, the remarks of a police officer in answer to questions 
that imply the defendant is a man "It all depends on 
\Vhether you have other cases with this person or not. We 
know him pretty well," can easily paint a picture in the 
minds of a juror that here is a defendant who has a police 
record of sex offenses or at least of other offenses. Especial-
ly in view of the fact, when challenged specifically, Officer 
Dyer could state no crime of any nature this man was 
guilty of. If this were not a sex offen1se of the particular 
type described, the prejudice arising may be slight; but in 
this particular instance, and in the context in which the 
answer was given, the results could not but have preju-
diced the defendant in the minds of the jurors who heard 
the answer given. The testimon~ quoted above indicates 
clearly an~ attempt by the officer to support the district 
attorney's opening remarks, and to evade stating the 
truth. That the defendant had, as admitted later in the 
testimony of the officer, denied his guilt strongly. 
It should be noted that immediately after the testi-
mony complained of above, the defendant's attorney re-
quested that the jury be excused and a matter discussed 
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in its absence. This motion was denied by the court, as 
recorded on the bottom of page 97. The purpose in making 
the motion, was to attempt to correct or remove, immed-
iately, and not in the presence of the jury, the prejudice 
that the defendant contends the remarks caused. 
POINT III 
THATTHECOURTERREDINREMARKSMADEDU~ 
ING THE TRIAL, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY, 
THAT AMOUNTED TO A PREJUDICIAL COMMENT 
UPON THE EVIDENCE BY THE COURT. 
The transcript will indicate it was the contention of 
the defendant during the trial that the accusation made 
by his daughter was based upon the influence of other 
relatives who desire to secure custody of the girl. The 
transcript will further indicate that the person alleged by 
the defendant to be primarily responsible for the girl mak-
ing the accusation was one Freda, sworn Aunt Freda. At 
page 75 of the transcript, upon cross examination of the 
complaintant, Sherry Myers, the following testimony was 
given: 
Q (By attorney for defendant.) In fact, before 
you answer my questions, you look at Freda, don't 
you? 
A Yes. 
Q Why? 
A I don't know. 
THE COURT: The record may show that coun-
sel stands between Aunt Freda and the witness. 
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Q May the record show that I asked her if 
she was looking at Aunt Freda? 
TilE COURT: Yes. 
During the cross examination of the defendant's moth-
er, Mary Heath, the district attorney asked permission to 
approach the bench and after a bench conference, the court 
made the following statement to the jury, without solici-
tation by either side, as revealed on page 135 of the 
transcript. 
THE COURT: The record may show there has 
been an injection which might tend to bear upon 
this woman's mental capacity and the court has 
ruled that you may ask. You may proceed. 
The district attorney was then allowed to ask the 
\Vitness if she suffered from hallucinations, and to go into 
detail upon cross examination as to her psychiatric treat-
ments, and hospitalizations, etc. 
The contention of the defendant that Aunt F'reda had 
encouraged the child to make accusations against her 
father was primarily substantiated by the testimony of 
~tary Heath. The court's comment that question of her 
1nental capacity had been raised and that the State could 
go into the matter, was a comment upon the weight that 
the jury should give to this witness' testimony, which only 
the finder of fact should make. 
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POINT IV 
THAT THE ERRORS O·F THE COURT ARE CUMULA-
TIVE, AND WHEN VIEWED IN CONNE·CTION WITH 
EACH OTHER, RESULTED IN PREJUDICE TO THIS 
DEFENDANT. 
Aside from the contention that the defendant was 
denied a public trial by the court's excluding from the 
courtroom witnesses during a portion of the trial, there 
remains the other points heretofore argued. The refusal of 
the court to grant a mistrial based upon the testimony of 
Officer Dyer, and the remarks of the court commenting 
upon the evidence offered by the defendant's mother, Mary 
Heath. 
The picture which was painted by the State, through 
remarks made, and orders entered, by the court, was to 
suggest to the jury that the defendant was the son of an 
emotionally and mentally ill person, had an extensive 
police record, and was well known to the police depart-
ment. The fact that the Officer admitted he knew of no 
crimes the defendant was guilty of could not lessen, but 
slightly, the impact of his testimony. 
The court has often1 stated that the charge of rape is 
one that is easily made and is hard to disprove. In this 
case the father is accused of raping his ten year old daugh-
ter. The accusation alone imparts a prejudice to a defend-
ant. The sentence to be meted out by our statute of from 
twenty years to life indicates the gravity of the charge. 
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Casual remarks by the court, or from a prosecution 
witness, may in other cases impart little damage. In this 
case, however, the remarks complained of are such, it is 
respectfully submitted, that could not help but stoke the 
fires of prejudice and revulsion that the very nature of 
the charge ignite in most jurors' minds. 
CONCLUSION 
That the conviction of this defendant should be re-
versed in that he was deprived of a fair, orderly, public 
trial. That improper evidence was received and that said 
evidence and the remarks of the court prejudiced the de-
fendant in the eyes of the jury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. G. BINGHAM 
1001 First Security Bank Bldg. 
Ogden, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
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